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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
PROTECTING THE OLDER WORKER
Laws both at the federal level' and in thirty-one states 2 make
discrimination against certain individuals because of their age
illegal. These laws are designed to protect a specified class of
people, normally those from forty to sixty-five years" old, both
from an employer's refusal to hire or promote them and from his
decision to dismiss them solely because of their age. Yet few
people know that this type of discrimination even occurs, much
less is forbidden. The term "discriminate" when used in an em-
ployment setting brings to mind biases as to race, sex, or religion,
but rarely bias as to age. The irony is that various age groups are
minorities to which every person must belong.
Unlike racial discrimination, age discrimination statutes do not
prohibit all forms of discrimination but only those forms that are
arbitrary.3 In this respect age is most analogous to sex as a basis
of discrimination: in neither case has a conclusive statutory pre-
sumption been made that these factors are irrelevant in an em-
1 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621- 634 (1970).
2
Alaska, ALAS. STAT. §§ 18.80.200 to 18.80.280 (1971); California,CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE ANN. §§2070-2078 (West Supp. 1972); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
80-11-16 and 80-11-17 (1963); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 88 31-126 to 31-128
(1958), as amended, (Supp. 1972); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§710-713
(Supp. 1970); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (Supp. 1971); Hawaii, HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 378-2 (1968); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1601 to 44-1606 (Supp. 1971); Illinois,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§881-887 (Supp. 1972); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2318
to 40-2828 (1965); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 194.18 (Supp. 1972); Kentucky, KY. REV.
STAT. §§ 344.010 et. seq. (1971), as amended, [1972] Acts of Ky. 686; Louisiana, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§23.892 and 23.893 (1964); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§§ 861-864 (Supp. 1972); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, 88 1-20 (1972); Mas-
sachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151 B, § 4 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971); Michigan,
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §423.303a (1967); Montana, House Joint Resolution No. 12,
[1961] Laws of Mont. 840; Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§48-1101 to 48-1106 (1968);
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (Supp. 1971); New Jersey, N.J. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-28 (Supp. 1971); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-1
to 4-33-13 (Supp. 1971); New York, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1972); North
Dakota, N.D. CODE ANN. §§ 34-01-17 and 34-01-18 (Supp. 1971); Ohio, OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (1965); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010 to 669.115 (1971);
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 88 951-963 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1972);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§28-6-1 to 28-6-21 (1969); Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.090, 49.60,180 to 49.60.210 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 197 1);
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-1 to 5-11-19 (1971); and Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 1 11.3 to 111.37 (Supp. 1972).
3 See notes 64-86 and accompanying text infra.
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ployment situation; in both situations the employer must make his
decision to hire or not to hire on the abilities of the individual and
not on assumptions, proven or unproven, about the class as a
whole.4 This note considers the extent of arbitrary age dis-
crimination and what measures have been taken and should be
taken to combat it.
I. THE EXTENT OF AGE DISCRIMINATION
An increasing number of older workers, aged forty to sixty-five,
are unable to find jobs and are forced to withdraw from the labor
market altogether. 5 From 1960 to 1970 the number of men be-
tween forty and sixty-four who annually left the work force grew
from 1.4 million to 2.1 million-an increase of 40 percent.6 In
June of 1971, 1,025,000 people aged forty-five and older were
unemployed,7 while the unemployment figure for the same group
in January of 1969 was only 596,000, seasonally adjusted. 8 Thus,
in a period of eighteen months the unemployment of older work-
ers increased by 72 percent.
A comparison with unemployment rates for younger workers, 9
in terms of length of unemployment, is appropriate here. In June
of 1971, long-term joblessness, i.e., joblessness for fifteen weeks
or longer, involved one out of every three unemployed older
workers as compared with one out of four younger ones.10 More-
over, 205,000 of the 353,000 older workers who qualified as
long-term unemployed had been unemployed for twenty-seven
weeks or more, representing a 327 percent increase from the
January, 1969, figure of 48,000.11 Thus at the end of the first half
of 1971 the average length of unemployment for people forty-five
and over was seventeen weeks, while for all other unemployed
persons it was somewhat more than ten weeks 2
To view the employment problem in its entirety, the income
4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, at 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S 1965 REPORT].
5 Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Cong., I st Sess. 62 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
6 Hearings on Unemployment Among Older Workers Before the Senate Special Comm.
on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
7 Id.
8 id.
9 For purposes of this article, "younger worker" means a worker under age forty.
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levels of older workers must be examined. Studies have shown
that the older a person is the greater are his chances of being
below the federal poverty level. According to 1965 census data,
32.3 percent of the individuals between the ages of fifty-five and
sixty-four were below the poverty level, compared to 25.2 percent
of the forty-five to fifty-four age group and 13.4 percent of those
twenty-five to thirty-four.13 Eight and a half million people aged
forty-five and older were below the poverty level in 1971.14
These statistics set out the parameters of a very human prob-
lem. It would be naive to say that all the employment problems of
the older worker are caused by age discrimination. It would be
even more naive, however, to believe that age discrimination does
not have a measurable and probably substantial bearing on these
statistics. As the Secretary of Labor indicated to Congress:
Almost three out of every five employers covered by the
survey have in effect age limitations (most frequently between
45 and 55) on new hires which they apply without consid-
eration of an applicant's other qualifications. Twenty-seven
percent of the employers reported formal upper age speci-
fications for some or all occupations. It was determined on
investigation that an additional 30 percent follow such policy
in practice.
15
The survey he mentions was conducted by the Bureau of Employ-
ment Security.1 6 The results of this survey would not be so
disturbing if they reflected a preference of employers for younger
people based on proven superior working ability. Unfortunately,
the survey shows that about two-thirds of the employers set age
limits "without consideration of an applicant's -other quali-
fications"; 1 7 that is to say, these employers arbitrarily dis-
criminate because of age.
The absurdity of arbitrary age limits becomes apparent when
several of the employers' most common reasons for setting them
are scrutinized. While there may be a grain of truth in each reason
for age limits, there is not enough to justify the employer's ac-
tions. For example, although physical requirements of the job, the
primary reason cited by employers for setting age limits,", may at
13 1967 Hearings, supra note 5, at 183 (statement of Mr. Sheppard).
14 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 279.
15 SECRETARY'S 1965 REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
16 Id.
17 1d.
18 Hiring Policies, Prejudices and the Older Worker, 88 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 968, 969
(1965).
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times be a valid basis for disqualifying an unfit individual from a
job, they should not serve to disqualify an entire age group. 19
Most studies agree there is a gradual decline in job performance
after the worker passes the age of thirty.20 Yet studies of the
effects of age on job performance have also shown that any
variations in performance between various age groups are slight.21
More importantly, however, these studies have concluded that the
output of a particular individual is likely to differ sharply from the
average of his age group. 22 These findings make generalizations
about age and job performance an unsupportable basis for whole-
sale exclusions of age groups. The studies dealing with job per-
formance have also found that there is almost no difference be-
tween the attendance records of the older and younger worker.23
Other studies have shown that older workers are more prone to
long-term, but not necessarily work-debilitating, conditions and
that there are fewer brief, but severe, illnesses among older work-
ers.2 4 Furthermore, the lower life expectancy of an older worker
should concern the employer only if it affects the period for which
the worker will stay with him. And, statistically, the older worker
stays on a particular job longer than the younger worker 5
19 In 70 percent of the cases where employers claimed that age limits were based on
physical requirements, no investigations had in fact been made to demonstrate a valid
relationship between the physical requirements and the age limits. SECRETARY'S 1965
REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. Moreover, there was a vast difference among employers' views
as to what age limits to set even where a bona fide physical requirement did exist. In jobs
with comparable physical exertions and demands for strength, the exclusionary age limits
ranged from twenty-five to sixty years. Id.
20 See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: The Problem of the Older Worker, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 395 (1966); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards
Bulletin No. 1223, at 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Labor Bulletin No. 12231.
21 See Mark, The Older Worker: Measurement of Job Performance and Age, 79
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1410, 1412-13 (1956). This study of piecework operation in the
footwear and clothing industries found that beginning with age fifty-five, job performance
figures did show a decline which, although statistically significant, was not of serious
proportions. Id. at 1413. In an extension of this study covering twenty-six companies in
footwear and furniture manufacturing the conclusions were the same with differences
between age groups being particularly small. See also Labor Bulletin No. 1223, supra note
20, at 1.
22 Labor Bulletin No. 1223, supra note 20, at I; Mark, supra note 21, at 1413. For
example, the output of male machine operators between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-four
may vary 13.7 percent from the median, and for women in the same age and occupation
groups the variations is I I percent. Id. at 1412.
23 Labor Bulletin No. 1223, supra note 20, at 2. In the eleven footwear plants used in
one of the studies the attendance indexes between the six age groups (under 25, 25-34,
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over) varied less than 1 percent for men and 1 percent
for women. In the furniture industries the variation between age groups was less than 4
percent for both sexes. id. Here not even the relative differences between the age groups
can be used to legitimize arbitrary preference for younger workers.
24 SECRETARY'S 1965 REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
25 For example, for the twenty to twenty-four age group the expected number of years
on a job is six, for the forty-five to fifty-four age group it is nine, and for those between
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Another major source of age discrimination in employment is a
group of personnel programs and practices collectively known as
institutional arrangements. These include such practices as pro-
motion-from-within policies, age balances, seniority systems, and
pension plans. These institutional arrangements may have as great
an effect on the older worker's exclusion from employment as
employer attitudes do.26 Yet, unlike employer attitudes, these
programs and policies have a valid primary purpose. It is only as a
side effect that they promote age discrimination.
For example, pension plans pose considerable dilemmas for the
older worker. When he is displaced by factors over which he has
no control,27 the older worker often finds that the pension plan to
which he or his employer has been contributing for many years is
of no value to him. Although many plans have vesting rights,
28
most of the plans require that the employee work for ten or fifteen
years before the vesting rights come into effect. 29 Whether or not
an employee has vested rights under his old plan, he faces opposi-
tion from prospective new employers because of other aspects of
pension plans, primarily cost factors. Generally, pension plans
provide for either fixed benefits for every employee with variable
contributions based on expected work life,3 0 or a fixed cost with
variable benefits depending on expected work life. 3 ' Under one
plan the cost may become prohibitive for the employer and under
the other the employee may end up with few or no benefits after
retirement. Both programs have the same effect: an older worker
seeking a new job will be discriminated against because of his age.
Moreover, many pension plans contain age group exclusions
which prohibit people over certain ages from participating in a
plan at all. 32
fifty-five and sixty-four, it is seven and a half years. 1967 Hearings, supra note 5, at 274.
These figures are also borne out by an earlier study done by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Labor Bulletin No. 1223, supra note 20, at 2.
26 SECRETARY'S 1965 REPORT, supra note 4, at 15.
27 For example, a worker may be laid off or his plant may be closed. From 1954 to 1967,
the annual number of business failures ranged from 11,000 to 17,000. Hearings Before the
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 1478 (1970) (statement of Professor
Bernstein) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. In 1967, almost one-fourth of these
shutdowns occurred in businesses over ten years old. Id. at 1479. Thus, unless he works
for a large and stable corporation, no employee can be assured that he will ever receive
back the money he has contributed to his company's pension plan.
28 In 1958, 60 percent of limited benefit plans surveyed had vesting provisions, that is,
the worker has an equity in the pension plan and will receive that equity when he reaches
retirement age no matter where he is. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics Bulletin No. 1407, at 11 (1962).
29 1970 Hearings, supra note 27, at 1478.
30 See Note, supra note 20, at 402.
31 Id. at 403.
32 A 1964 study showed such exclusions vary widely from age fifty to age sixty-five with
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Given the attitudinal and institutional barriers the older worker
faces when he is looking for a new job, it is not surprising that
significant actions have been required to aid him. Most forms of
assistance have been legislative, for, as Secretary Wirtz said,
"The possibility of a new non-statutory means of dealing with
such arbitrary discrimination has been explored. That area is
barren."'33 The unique problem such legislation faces is how to
accommodate the needs of the older worker with those valid
reasons for not hiring such individuals.
I1. ATTACKING AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. State Statutes
At present, thirty-one states have a statute or resolution prohib-
iting employment discrimination based on age. 34 There is a wide
variation as to what age groups are protected, who is exempt,
what practices are prohibited, what the penalties are, and how the
statutes are enforced. 35 Some of these statutes are nothing more
than exercises in legislative drafting,3 6 although some states do
appear committed to ending age discrimination. 37 Yet, in most
states the enforcement of age discrimination statutes has been
minimal. While there have been no recent studies of state enforce-
ment, a 1963 study showed that of the 1,560 "age" complaints
received by state agencies that year, over half were filed in the
four states with vigorous enforcement programs.3 8
at least one-third of them set below age fifty-five. See SECRETARY'S 1965 REPORT, supra
note 4, at 17.
33 SECRETARY'S 1965 REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
34 See sources cited in note 2 supra.
35 There is a summary of the state statutory provisions dealing with age discrimination
in employment in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINIS-
TRATION, REPORT COVERING ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ACT DURING 1971, at 18-29,
submitted to Congress in 1972 in accordance with Section 13 of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 62 1-634 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S
1971 REPORT].
36 For example, the Indiana statute forbids age discrimination against any person be-
tween forty and sixty-five by the state, all labor organizations, and all private employers.
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2318 to 40-2328 (1965). See IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2319 (1965)
which makes it an unfair employment practice to "dismiss from employment, or to refuse
to employ or rehire, any person solely because of his age." Yet, under this liberal act, there
are no penalties for violations, and the enforcement agency only has the power to con-
ciliate. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2323 (1965).
37 The New York Human Rights Commission has been the most vigorous enforcer of
age discrimination prohibitions. Between July 1, 1958, and June 20, 1966, the Commission
received 755 "age" complaints averaging about 15 percent of the total yearly employment
complaints. In over one-third of these complaints the commission found unlawful practices
or patterns and corrected them. 1967 Hearings, supra note 5, at 232 (statement of Judge
Conway).
a8 Note, supra note 20, at 413.
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B. Constitutional Protection
With the passage of state and federal legislation forbidding
employment discrimination based on age, the use of constitutional
arguments is limited to those people who are unprotected by the
statutes. Indeed, there is only one case in which unconstitutional
age discrimination is discussed. In Weiss v. Walsh,39 a sev-
enty-year-old professor sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
a New York university from giving to another an endowed chair
the university had first offered the plaintiff but had subsequently
revoked. In refusing to grant the injunction, the court said the fact
that age is not mentioned in the due process clause does not
insulate age classifications from constitutional scrutiny, although
they are less likely than racial or religious classifications to be
invidious, since age "generally bears some relation to mental and
physical capacity." 40 It is interesting to note that the court left
open the possibility that an "age" argument might succeed when
alleged by a person who is unprotected by statute and who is not
at either. end of the age spectrum. Moreover, the Weiss court
noted that if a plaintiff could show an age limit had been dis-
criminatorily applied, the equal protection clause's prohibition
against selective enforcement of the law would apply. 41
C. The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (Act or
ADEA)42 is an outgrowth of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.43 Section 715 of that title directed the Secretary of Labor to
make a "full and complete study" of the problem of discrimination
based on age and to submit a report to Congress.44 The report,
The Older American Worker, was the catalyst to enactment of the
ADEA.
The ADEA has three purposes: to promote the employment of
persons who are over forty years of age but under sixty-five; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and to help
employers and workers solve the problems of the impact of age on
employment. 45 The Act prohibits discrimination because of age in
39 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
40 Id. at 77.
41 Id. at 78.
42 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970).
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
44 Id. § 2000e- 14.
4 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
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matters of hiring, job retention, compensation, and other terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. 46 It covers most employ-
ers of twenty-five or more persons 47 and the public and private
employment agencies serving such employers, 4 as well as labor
organizations having twenty-five or more members. 49 The Act
also sets forth four defenses or exceptions for actions which
would otherwise be prohibited.
50
The Secretary of Labor is given broad responsibilities. He must
conduct education and research programs designed to show the
needs, utilization, and potential of older workers, 51 as well as
make a study of institutional arrangements giving rise to in-
voluntary retirement. 52 He may also make any rules or regulations
deemed necessary to fulfill the Act's purposes, including the es-
tablishment of reasonable exemptions.
53
Enforcement and recovery procedures 54 are similar to those of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).55 The major difference is
that the ADEA specifically requires that attempts must be made
to eliminate the discriminatory practice through informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion before any legal pro-
ceedings can be initiated. 56 Any aggrieved party may then sue,57
provided that he gives at least sixty days notice of his intent to
file.58 Private right to sue is terminated when the Secretary starts
an action to enforce the employee's rights. 59 If an alleged viola-
tion occurs in a state with age discrimination legislation, no action
can be taken until the state has had an opportunity to act.6 0
46 Id. § 623(a)(1).
47 Id. § 630(b).
48 Id. § 630(c).
49 Id. § 630(e).
50 Id. § 623(f). See text accompanying notes 64-86 infra.
51 Id. § 622.
52 Id. § 624.
53 Id. § 628. Rules were promulgated and are set out in 29 C.F.R. pt. 850 (1972).
54 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
55 Id. H 211 (b), 216, and 217.
56 Id. § 626(d).
57 Id. § 626(c).
58 Id. § 626(d).
59 Id. § 626(c).
Bold. §633. As this overview of its provisions shows, the ADEA is a hybrid of Title
VII and the FLSA. The basic prohibitions and exceptions of the ADEA are very similar
to Title VII, whereas the enforcement provisions are generally those of the FLSA. The
reason for commingling can be found in the ADEA's legislative history. Initially, there
were two Senate bills proposed. The administration bill was remarkably similar to Title
VII except that a new bureaucracy would have been established in the Department of
Labor with cease and desist powers subject to enforcement at the court of appeals level.
S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The other bill, proposed by Senator Javits as an
amendment to the FLSA, would have put responsibility for enforcement of the ADEA
under the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division. S. 788, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1967). Athough the ADEA as enacted does not specify that it should be administered by
FALL 1972]
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For purposes of enforcement the most important parts of the
ADEA are the four exceptions in Subsection 4(f).61 Depending on
the manner in which these exceptions are construed, the Act can
become either a strong antidiscrimination measure or a mere
statement of public policy. Fortunately, the former seems to be
the trend; the Secretary has interpreted the exceptions in Subsec-
tion 4(f) narrowly,6 2 and his opinion has been given great weight
by those few courts that have dealt with the ADEA.63
1. Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications (BFOQ) Reason-
ably Necessary to the Normal Operations of the Particular Busi-
ness-The Secretary has interpreted this exception to be of limit-
ed scope and application. 64 Furthermore, he has said that the
burden of proof in establishing that a BFOQ exists is on the one
who relies upon the exception.65 Recently one court ruled on the
requirements necessary to establish a BFOQ. After finding a
prima facie case of age discrimination, the court in Hodgson v.
Tamiami Trail Tours66 applied the same test to an age BFOQ as
used in Diaz v. Pan American WorldAirways67 to determine a sex
BFOQ-that is, whether the employer has shown "that the es-
sence of its business would be undermined" 68 by hiring employees
older than its established age limit. Moreover, the court held that
the defendant has the burden of proving that there is "reasonable
cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing" that sub-
stantially all people over the age limit cannot perform the job
safely and efficiently. 69 Although the Tamiami court found that
the defendant had carried his burden of proof, it is significant that
the one court that has ruled on the BFOQ exception has deter-
mined that BFOQs are applicable only in very special and limited
cases of age discrimination.
2. Differentiation Based Upon Reasonable Factors Other
Than Age- This exception, also found in Subsection 4(0(1) of the
the Wage and Hour Division, the Secretary has delegated to that Division the powers to
enforce, to make rules and regulations, and to interpret the Act. Secretary of Labor Order
No. 11-68, 33 FED. REG. 9690 (1968). The most unfortunate result of this compromise
was the deletion of the cease and desist power in favor of civil suits.
61 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1970).
6229 C.F.R. pt. 860 (1972).
6 See, e.g., Grossfield v. Saunders Co., I F.E.P. Cases 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and
Hodgson v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn.
1971).
6429 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1972).
r5 id.
66 4 F.E.P. Cases 728 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
67 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (197 1).
684 F.E.P. Cases at 731.
69 Id. at 731-32. The Tamiami court was quoting and approving the test used by the
same court in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 408 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Act, 70 is unique to age discrimination and has no counterpart in
other employment discrimination legislation. Since it is such an
open-ended exception, the Secretary has gone to great lengths to
explain its scope.7 1 Since Congress did not intend to require the
employment of anyone, regardless of age, who is disqualified on
other grounds, 72 this exception is necessary to allow a showing of
the other factors which caused an employer not to hire or promote
a person in the protected group. The exception must be construed
narrowly, however, and the burden of proof to establish a valid
differentiation is on the one who seeks to rely on the exception. 73
Although no case has dealt with this exception in the setting of
a refusal to hire, there has been one decision dealing with termina-
tion based on reasonable factors other than age. In Stringfellow v.
Monsanto Co.,74 the defendant reduced the number of employees
in each of its plant's three departments. The determination of
which employees were to be laid off was based on the application
of a number of criteria to each employee's job performance. In
each instance of alleged age discrimination, the court concluded
that "the differentiation resulting from the application of such
factors and criteria in the plan of evaluation which Monsanto used
was based on reasonable factors other than age. . .. ,"75 The court,
however, failed to determine whether the criteria themselves were
age-biased, which is essential to finding a valid differentiation.
Given the Secretary's general interpretation of this exception and
the ease with which it can be misapplied, greater efforts should be
made to establish a more definite standard.
3. Bona Fide Seniority Systems or Any Other Employee
Benefit Plans-This exception in Section 4(f)(2)76 was enacted to
cover those institutional arrangements discussed earlier 77 which
have a valid primary purpose but also a discriminatory side effect.
In order for a seniority system to be bona fide, it must be primar-
ily based on length of service as the criterion for allocating em-
ployment opportunities, regardless of the employee's age.
78 It
7029 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
7' 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103, 860.104 (1972).
72 Id. § 860:103(c). Jobs which may require special degrees of physical fitness or levels
of education may qualify for this execption. Id. §§860.103(f)(l)(i), (ii). However, since
there can be no grouping or stereotyping (id. § 860.103(f)(1)(iii)) a proven relationship
between the job and its qualifications must be shown. Id. § 860.103(f)(2). Cost alone will
never be a valid determination. Id. § 860.103(h).
73 Id. § 860.103(e).
74320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
75 Id. at 1180.
76 29 U.S.C. § 623(0)(2) (1970).
7 7 See text accompanying notes 26 - 32supra.
78 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1972).
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must also be applied uniformly.7 9 For example, adoption of a
seniority plan which gives those with longer service lesser rights
in case of discharge or perpetuates prior discriminatory age prac-
tices will be considered a "subterfuge to evade" the Act.8 0 An
employer does not, however, have to offer an employee protected
by the Act the same employee benefits as younger workers so
long as the differential between them is in accordance with a bona
fide benefit plan, be it a pension, insurance, health, or retirement
plan.81
The presence of a bona fide employee benefit plan cannot allow
an employer to justify his otherwise unprotected actions against
nonparticipants. In Hodgson v. American Hardware Mutual In-
surance Co.,8 2 an employer had a bona fide elective retirement
plan that required participating men to retire at sixty-five and
participating women to retire at sixty-two. The employer had the
same mandatory retirement ages for nonparticipants, which the
Secretary said violated the ADEA as to the nonparticipating
women. Initially the court found that there was a violation of the
Subsection 4(a) prohibition on discharge since, regarding pro-
tected nonparticipants, the compulsory retirement age was based
merely on an employer's desires and not on a bona fide retirement
plan. The fact that the employer may have "many sound business
reasons" for wanting a uniform retirement age did not matter
since Congress had determined that the "overall economic in-
terests of the country, as served through older worker employ-
ment, override such parochial interests of employers."83' Regard-
ing the defendant's contention that Subsection 4(f)(2) only excepts
hiring from the operation of the bona fide retirement plan, the
court concluded that Subsection 4(0)(2) covered both situations,
since "conceptually there is no difference between a mandatory
retirement age of sixty-two and a refusal to hire anyone who is
sixty-two years old,"8 4 and that the employer's interests are the
same in both situations. By so reading this exception, the court
clearly fulfills the purpose of the Act even though a literal reading
might not allow that result.
4. Good Cause-Subsection 4(f)(3)85 allows an employer "to
discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause."
79 Id. § 860.105(c).
80 Id. § 860.105(b).
81 Id. § 860.120(a).
82 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
83 Id. at 228.
84 Id. at 229.
85 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1970).
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Although this provision is not discussed in the legislative history
or the Secretary's Interpretive Bulletin, it presents some in-
teresting problems about arbitration. The question of what forum
is to determine just cause and how much weight one forum must
give to another's determination could raise more problems than
the other exceptions. At present the courts are in a state of
disarray in this matter.
8 6
III. ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATION
Within limited exceptions, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary age
discrimination in employment and promotes the employment of
workers between forty and sixty-five years old. Yet the
effectiveness of this Act, like any other, is not determined solely
by the bare words of the congressional mandate but by the ability
of the body charged with enforcement of the Act. Enforcement of
the ADEA has been placed in the hands of the Secretary of
Labor, who has in turn delegated enforcement and rulemaking
powers to the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department
and research and study powers to the Assistant Secretary for
Manpower.8
7
Before any legal action can be taken for an ADEA violation,
the Wage and Hour Division is directed to conciliate, confer, and
if possible persuade the allegedly discriminatory employer, em-
ployment agency, or labor organization and the older worker to
reach a settlement.8 8 When conciliation fails, the Wage and Hour
86 For an example of conflicting court policies on the effect of a prior determination of
discrimination, see Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), holding
that an employee could not initiate a Title Vii action after an adverse arbitration award,
andHutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970), holding that
an arbitration award could not be conclusive as to the employee's Title VII rights.
87 Secretary of Labor Order No. 11-68, 33 FED. REG. 9690 (1968).
88 29 U.S.C § 626(d) (1970). In fiscal year 197 1, the Division made 6,846 investigations
and found one or more violations of the Act in 36 percent of them. SECRETARY'S 1971
REPORT, supra note 35, at 2. As a result of conciliation efforts, agreements to correct
prohibited practices, which sometimes include payment of substantial sums to the older
worker, were obtained without legal action against almost nine-tenths of the 2,522 estab-
lishments found in violation. Id. at 3. Although the absolute number of investigations is
down from the fiscal year 1970 figure of 10,956, this does not indicate that the Division is
being less diligent in its administration of the Act. Indeed, the opposite is probably true
since of all the 1970 investigations, over three-quarters were accomplished while in-
vestigating other programs under the Wage and Hour Division's jurisdiction. Thus the
ADEA investigation was merely an adjunct to the primary purpose of the investigation
and probably was not as carefully done. This policy has ended, partially because of the
realization that the ADEA was receiving second-class treatment and partially because of
a study showing that ADEA violations were more likely to occur in businesses that were
generally in compliance with the FLSA and other programs administered by the Division.
Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 9 1 st Cong., I st Sess., pt. 9, at 1172
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Division, in the name of the Secretary of Labor, has not hesitated
to start legal actions.89
One recent case, Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association,9" may signal the approach the courts will take in
enforcing the prohibitions of the ADEA. The case involved a
forty-seven-year-old woman who had been denied employment as
a teller at a savings and loan association that had followed a
practice of not hiring tellers over the age of forty. The Secretary
brought an action in federal district court under Subsection 7(b) of
the Act to enjoin the defendant from violating the prohibitions
against age discrimination and to require payment to the applicant
of money lost as a result of the violation. The district court
granted an injunction applicable to tellers only but refused to
order payment of a wage recovery because the Secretary did not
carry his burden of proof.91
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened the injunction
and granted the payment of wages to the individual complainant.
Regarding the burden of proof problem, the court of appeals
found that the district court had placed too heavy a burden on the
Secretary. It held that as in all other discrimination cases, the
plaintiff is required only to make a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant
to justify the existence of any disparities. 92 Because of docu-
mentary evidence and evidence of specific instances of dis-
(1969) (remarks of Mr. Robertson) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]. Thus in fiscal
year 197 1, only one-half of the ADEA investigations were conducted in conjunction with
other programs. SECRETARY'S 1971 REPORT, supra note 35, at 14 (table 3). There were,
therefore, more solely ADEA investigations conducted-in fiscal 1971 than in fiscal 1970.
The Wage and Hour Division is also making a more determined effort to deal with the
more subtle types of violations. For example, in fiscal 1970 two-thirds of the investigations
dealt with illegal advertising, where the Wage and Hour Division does little more than
issue a letter to the violator telling him to stop using age-related advertisements. Interview
with Richard McMullen, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, in Washington,
D.C., Mar. 3, 1972. In fiscal 1971, illegal advertising complaints, while sti!l constituting a
majority of the investigations, were reduced by about 20 percent. SECRETARY'S 1971
REPORT, supra note 35, at 16 (table 5). Whether this is a result of a conscious shift in
Division tactics or a showing of greater employer awareness, the fact is that the Division is
undertaking investigations that will ultimately decide its administrative effectiveness and
test fully its conciliation apparatus.
89 During calendar year 1971, over fifty suits were filed, and over twenty-five judgments,
some of them filed in previous years, were issued enjoining further ADEA violations.
SECRETARY'S 1971 REPORT, supra note 35, at 3. Eight of these cases were dismissed on
stipulations of further compliance. Despite the statistics very few of the cases have been
reported, and many of those that have been reported do not help define the scope of the
ADEA but merely decide whether there is enough evidence to grant an injunction or back
pay. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Poole Truck Line, Inc., 4 F.E.P. Cases 265 (S.D. Ala. 1972);
Hodgson v. Bellingrath Trust, 2 F.E.P. Cases 1054 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
90455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
91 Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 3 F.E.P. Cases 16 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
92 455 F.2d at 822.
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criminatory conduct, the court had no trouble finding that the
Secretary had made a prima facie case. More importantly, the
court said in dicta that if the Secretary had shown merely that no
one in the protected age group had been hired over the last year
as a teller, those statistics alone might have been enough to
establish a prima facie case. 93 This could have an important
impact on the future enforcement of the Act as the methods of
and excuses for avoiding its requirements become more subtle
and sophisticated.
The court also dealt with remedies available for ADEA viola-
tions. Since the Act incorporates Section 17 of the FLSA, the
court said the trial judge could have used a broad range of re-
medies, including "the issuance of injunctions to effectuate future
compliance with the Act and to restrain the continued withholding
of unpaid wages owing because of unlawful past dis-
crimination."9 4 In light of these powers, the court found that
limiting the injunction to tellers was unjustified. 95 Citing economy
of administration and the lack of burden on the employer, the
court made the injunction a permanent one covering all the de-
fendant's operations without any direct evidence that it had in the
past violated the Act in any of its other departments.
These views on burden of proof, use of statistics, and remedies
available for past discrimination, coupled with the tendency of
other courts to accept the Secretary's broad interpretation of the
Act's prohibitions and his narrow interpretation of the Subsection
4(f) exceptions, 96 make the prospects bright for future fulfillment
of the ADEA's purposes. Yet age discrimination will not be
ended by vigorous enforcement of the ADEA alone. Potentially
the most significant part of the Wage and Hour Division's activi-
ties is its educational efforts. So far the Division has distributed a
large number of nontechnical pamphlets and a few short
audio-visual presentations. 97 One of the Division's innovative ac-
tivities has been the establishment of Compliance Utilizing Edu-
cation (CUE).98 Under this program, company officials are taught
by Wage and Hour representatives to conduct systematic
analyses of their firms' wage, salary, and employment practices to
assure that such practices comply with the ADEA and other
93 Id. at 823.
94 Id. at 820.
95 Id.
96 See cases cited in note 63 supra.
97 SECRETARY'S 197 1 REPORT, supra note 35, at 5.
98 Id.
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requirements.9 9 Since age discrimination is related to employer
misconceptions about age and ability, having an "inside man" in a
company point out the fallacies may be an effective way to reduce
the problem. However, this assumes that those whose actions
made the ADEA necessary are capable of policing themselves.
Training is another area where some efforts have been made to
help the older worker. Unfortunately, these efforts have had only
limited impact. 100 Indeed, there is only one program specifically
designed to aid the older workers. Operation Mainstream concen-
trates on ways to provide work opportunities for older workers to
improve the environment of their communities. Admirable as this
program is, it does little to put the older person back into the labor
market with skills to offer prospective employers. The greatest
hope for the older worker is the Middle-Aged and Older Workers
Employment Bill.101 If enacted, this bill would direct the Secre-
tary of Labor to establish a mid-career development service to
provide training, counseling, and other supportive services to
upgrade the work skills of persons forty-five and older.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF
OLDER WORKERS
The ADEA is an important first step in attempting to deal with
a largely unrecognized problem in the employment setting. The
Act does have its shortcomings, however, and it is necessary to
examine some of the more important problems with current
efforts to eliminate age discrimination.
A. The Wage and Hour Division as an
Enforcement Agency
The Wage and Hour Division may not be the proper agency to
administer the ADEA. During the Senate hearings on the ADEA,
Senator Javits, a sponsor of the legislation, expressed the view
that the Act should be administered by the Division because he
feared a new enforcement agency would become another
inefficient and overworked bureaucracy like the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).10 2 However, there are
99 Id.
10 0 1n 1971, in all the programs under the Manpower Development and Training Act
only 4 percent of the enrollees were over forty-five. 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 279.
101 S. 1307, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
102 1967 Hearings, supra note 5, at 204.
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certain disadvantages to putting the enforcement of the ADEA
under the jurisdiction of an agency already charged with adminis-
tering other major legislation.' 03 One is the possibility that the
ADEA will receive low priority. There is evidence that this has
happened. 10 4 Priorities must be set in the Division, of course, but
if there were a special agency charged only with eliminating age
discrimination this conflict would not arise. Moreover, the Divi-
sion does not have a special group of expert investigators to
oversee enforcement of the Act since it believes that all of its
1,000 employees should be generalists. 0 5 This practice deprives
proponents of the fledgling ADEA of a stronger voice in Division
policy-making.
B. Education and Attitudes
The possible impact of education on age discrimination in em-
ployment is unknown. Since in large part age discrimination is
based on erroneous employer assumptions about older workers,
effective distribution of information about age and ability can be
important. Unlike other forms of discrimination, a solution to age
discrimination is not shackled by the transmission of prejudices
outside the work setting. Realizing this, Congress made education
one of the main purposes of the ADEA.10 6 Yet the total budget
for all ADEA educational activities is only $3 million,'10 7 and the
Wage and Hour Division has not had a single workshop dealing
solely with the ADEA.
a08
C. Involuntary Retirement
Involuntary retirement is an aspect of age discrimination about
which there is a paucity of information, but nevertheless it may
have a significant effect on the employment patterns of American
society. In an attempt to measure this effect, Congress directed
' 03 The Wage and Hour Division has major responsibility for enforcing the Fair Labor
Standards Act, Public Contract Acts, Service Contract Act, Davis-Bacon and related acts,
and the federal wage garnishment restriction of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
104 In congressional testimony, Ben Robertson, then Deputy Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division, said an important study of three major industries with markedly low
percentages of blder workers was cancelled because priority had been given to a study of
the effects of the minimum wage on hospitals and educational institutions. 1969 Hearings,
supra note 88, at 1180.
105 Id. at 1179.
'°6See 29 U.S.C. §622 (1970).
107 Id.§ 634.
108 1969 Hearings, supra note 88, at 1178.
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the Secretary of Labor "to undertake an appropriate study of
institutional and other arrangements giving rise to involuntary
retirement.' 0 9 Although the Secretary has not completed his
study, the Social Security Administration has recently published a
study called the "Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries.' 10 The
survey covered a total of 4 percent of the three million males
within the sixty-two to sixty-five age group on July 1, 1968.11
Asked for the most important reason for leaving their jobs, 13
percent specified compulsory retirement. 112 The percentage of
respondents giving that answer increased in the higher age groups,
with 34 percent of men aged sixty-five specifying compulsory
retirement. This is natural since the general retirement age is still
sixty-five. Of this 34 percent of those who were sixty-five, 41
percent said they had no work limiting factors when they left the
job.l13 The significance of this figure lies in the fact that over
two-fifths of those men who retired at sixty-five could have con-
tinued to be productive members of the work force had they not
been required to retire. The economy is losing many experienced
workers because of arbitrary retirement limits. If the purpose of
the ADEA is to prevent the use of arbitrary age barriers, then
Congress should increase the protected class to include people
over sixty-five or at least make more flexible rules for this age
group.1l 4
V. CONCLUSION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is an
important step toward ending the use of age as a basis for ex-
cluding a large number of able people from productive service in
the labor market. The Act attempts to aid the older worker by
prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination, by promoting his employ-
ment, and by educating employers, employment agencies, and
labor unions about the true relationship between age and ability.
Through strong enforcement and zealous proselytization the Act
may be able to achieve most of its purposes. Yet the ADEA
focuses on only one aspect of the problem, namely employers and
109 29 U.S.C. § 624 (1970).
10 SECRETARY'S 1971 REPORT, supra note 35, at 7-9.
1 Id. at 8.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 9.
114 It is interesting to note that between one-half and one-third of the people over
sixty-five find it necessary to work to supplement their social security and/or pension
benefits. 1967 Hearings, supra note 5, at 70.
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other conduits to employment. Age discrimination is also caused
by the employment pattern and structure of the labor market.
Institutional arrangements, automation, technology, and shifting
occupational patterns all contribute to the age discrimination
problem. Unlike the effects of human prejudice, one cannot legis-
latively prohibit unwanted consequences of accepted societal
structures. The structures or patterns themselves must be
changed. In the meantime, the older worker should be offered a
full range of services with regard to work, placement, training,
rehabilitation, volunteer service, and retirement. By this ap-
proach, along with the ADEA, age discrimination in employment,
at least in its most easily remedied forms, can be reduced substan-
tially with a concomitant increase in benefits to the older worker
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